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In a series of ten preregistered experiments (N=2043), we investigate the effect of outcome valence 
on judgments of probability, negligence, and culpability – a phenomenon sometimes labelled 
moral (and legal) luck. We found that harmful outcomes, when contrasted with neutral outcomes, 
lead to increased perceived probability of harm ex post, and consequently to increased attribution 
of negligence and culpability. Rather than simply postulating a hindsight bias (as is common), we 
employ a variety of empirical means to demonstrate that the outcome-driven asymmetry across 
perceived probabilities constitutes a systematic cognitive distortion. We then explore three distinct 
strategies to alleviate the hindsight bias and its downstream effects on mens rea and culpability 
ascriptions. Not all are successful, but at least some prove promising. They should, we argue, be 
taken into consideration in criminal jurisprudence, where distortions due to the hindsight bias are 




1.1 Outcome Effects on Culpability 
Frank and Su drive to work. They are well-rested, alert and stick to the speed limit. A child jumps 
in front of Frank’s car and dies, whereas Su arrives at work without incident. Who is more to 
blame? In between-subjects designs, a pronounced outcome effect tends to arise: Frank is judged 
morally and legally more culpable than Su (henceforth the Outcome Effect). This might strike us 
as unjust, if we hold, with Kant (1978), that agents are morally responsible only for features of 
their actions over which they have control (the Control Principle).  
Philosophers assume that a difference in moral judgment arises even within-subjects, i.e. 
when people directly compare Frank’s and Su’s case (the Difference Intuition). This would give 
rise to the Problem of Resultant Moral Luck (cf. Williams, 1981, Nagel, 1979, Nelkin, 2004, 2019, 
2021, Hartman, 2017, Kamtekar & Nichols, 2019; for empirical work on moral luck, see e.g. 
Spranca et al. 1998, Cushman, 2008, Young et al. 2010, Nichols et al. 2014, Kneer & Machery, 
2019): We must square the consequentialist Difference Intuition with the Kantian Control 
Principle, but the two are fundamentally inconsistent. Importantly, however, Folk Morality 
disagrees: When presented with Frank and Su’s cases side by side, the vast majority of participants 
evaluate the two agents identically. Western Criminal Law, with its deep distaste for strict liability, 
sides with the Folk in this regard. So there might not be a complex philosophical problem (the 
within-subjects Difference Intuition assumed by philosophers seems to be empirically mistaken). 
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The practical problem, however, must be taken seriously: In everyday life, we are not confronted 
with two neat cases side-by-side. Usually, we assess situations where a concrete harm has occurred 
and here outcome is likely to have a distorting effect on our judgment, violating the Control 
Principle to which both the Law and the Folk are committed.  
 
1.2 The Mechanics of the Outcome Effect  
How can we alleviate the outcome effect? This depends, in parts, on its more intricate 
mechanics. There is some evidence in favour of a probabilistic account of moral luck-type 
phenomena (Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995; Kneer & Machery, 2019). On this account, the post-hoc 
probability of harming a child is perceived higher for Frank than for Su. It thus seems more 
appropriate to judge that Frank incurred a substantial risk than that Su did, which, in turn would 
mean he was more reckless or negligent than Su.1 If this account is on the right track, then a 
perceived difference in probability and risk drives an asymmetry of risk-related inculpating mental 
states and hence moral (and legal) evaluation (see Figure 1). The whole series of inferences from 
descriptive features to normative evaluation is innocuous, except for the first step, which is 
affected by the hindsight bias: in Frank’s case, people tend to exaggerate the degree to which a 
harmful outcome could, or should, have been anticipated (Fischhoff, 1975; 1980). To address the 
distorting effect of outcome on culpability judgments, this suggests, we must find ways to alleviate 
the hindsight bias – which is the topic of the paper.  
The paper proceeds as follows: We first explore whether the probabilistic account of the 
effect of outcome on culpability replicates (section 2). Our experiments are the first to control 
explicitly for the distinction between objective probability (probability from the perspective of the 
universe) and subjective probability (as perceived from the agent’s context). Having replicated the 
outcome effect on probability, mens rea and moral judgment, we show – rather than just assume, 
as is standardly the case – that it must be considered a bias. The effect of outcome is much more 
pronounced in between-subjects designs than in within-subjects designs, in which participants 
have the possibility to reflect on whether outcome should make a difference to their assessment of 
probability, mens rea and guilt (section 3). Once the process is clearly laid bare (see Figure 7), we 
turn to the core objective of the paper: Debiasing strategies. The first such strategy investigated is 
probability anchoring (section 4), in which we test whether giving participants the possibility to 
evaluate the likelihood of a harmful outcome before the consequences are revealed has an impact 
on their probability assessments ex post. The next strategy is counterfactual priming (section 5), 
where we investigate whether entertaining alternative outcomes reduces the outcome effect on 
probability, mens rea and moral judgments. Finally, we turn to probability stabilizing (section 6), 
in which an expert provides the actual ex ante probability of a harmful outcome from the point of 
view of a scientifically informed perspective. Figure 1 visualizes the different debiasing strategies. 
                                               
1 For the effect of outcome on possibly inculpating mental states more generally, see the literature on the Knobe effect 
(Knobe, 2003a, 2003b, 2010; for reviews, see Feltz, 2007, Cova, 2016) and the epistemic side-effect effect (Beebe & 
Buckwalter, 2010; Beebe & Jensen, 2012, Alfano et al. 2012, Kneer 2018). For empirical studies regarding the Knobe 
Effect and the Severity Bias conducted with legal experts (judges, lawyers and law students), see Kneer & Bourgeois-
Gironde (2017), Bourgeois-Gironde & Kneer (2018), Prochownik et al. (2020), Tobia (ms). 
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Probability anchoring and counterfactual priming attempt to prevent inappropriate inferences from 
outcome information to probability ex post in indirect fashion. By contrast, explicit probability 
stabilizing, for instance by invoking an expert, makes short shrift of the problem by directly 
stipulating the probability ex post so as to prevent inadequate downstream consequences on mens 
rea and culpability assessment. 
 
 
Figure 1: The order of information processing in negligence cases and possible debiasing 
strategies.  
 
To anticipate the findings, which we consider of considerable importance both for moral 
psychology and criminal jurisprudence: Consistent with previous research, the effects of outcome 
on probability post hoc and downstream variables such as mens rea and culpability are persistent 
and robust across experiments with different scenarios. These effects, we demonstrate, are the 
results of a cognitive bias (though for judgments concerning deserved punishment, they are not – 
a fact on which we will elaborate at length). Probability anchoring and counterfactual priming 
succeed in mitigating the outcome bias somewhat. However, neither strategy fully eradicates 
inappropriate inferences from outcome to probability and distorted downstream effects on mens 
rea and culpability judgments thus remain. What works best is probability stabilizing, which is 
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indeed a means courts sometimes resort to (though all too frequently they do not cf. for example 
Lee, 1988).   
 
2. Experiment 1: Outcome Effects 
 
Whereas there is no lack of literature concerning the hindsight bias (for a review, see e.g. Roese 
& Vohs, 2012), few studies explore the downstream effects on moral and legal culpability and the 
mechanism by way of which probability affects the latter. Exceptions are Kamin & Rachlinsky 
(1995), who show that perceived probability post hoc has an effect on perceived culpability. Kneer 
& Machery (2019) go one step further in demonstrating that the relation between outcome-driven 
perceived probability and culpability is itself mediated by perceived negligence of the agent.  
Our first experiment attempts to replicate these findings with a new scenario. It also 
introduces a methodological novelty: Rather than asking for the probability or likelihood of a 
harmful outcome simpliciter, we disambiguate the notion of probability into two kinds: Objective 
probability, i.e. the actual likelihood of an accident independent of potential epistemic distortions, 
and subjective probability, i.e. the probability of a bad outcome as perceived from the agent’s 
particular epistemic situation. The first question employed the locution “how likely was it from an 
objective point of view that [X would occur]”. To minimize confusion between types of probability 
among the participants, the subjective probability question was phrased in terms of the agent’s 
“having good reasons to believe that [X] would occur”. Evidently, subjective probability and 
reasons for belief are not perfectly coextensive. However, given the features that were salient in 
our scenarios, the two DVs are similar enough: A high subjective probability of a flood 
corresponds to good reasons for believing there will be a flood and vice versa.  
 
Objective probability: On a scale from 0 (completely unlikely) to 100 (certain) how likely 
was it from an objective point of view that there would be a flood this year? 
Reasons (subjective probability): To what extent do you agree with the following 
statement: Ms. Russel had good reasons to believe that there would be no flood this year. 
(0 = completely disagree; 100 = completely agree) 
 
2.1 Participants 
We recruited 195 participants online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address location was 
restricted to the USA. In line with the preregistered criteria,2 participants who failed an attention 
check, were not native speakers of the English language, took less than two minutes to complete 
the entire survey or failed the comprehension question were excluded, leaving a sample of 169 
participants (female: 47 %; mean age: 43 years, SD = 12 years, range: 19–82 years).3 
                                               
2 https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=3kq5bn. Preregistrations, stimuli and data for this and all further experiments 
can be found on the project’s OSF site under the following link: https://osf.io/e2u8q/. 
3 Experiments 1 and 3 are very similar, differing only with respect to a minor design choice (ex ante assessment of 
probability). Since we had planned from the outset to compare the results across designs, we preregistered and ran the 
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2.2 Methods and Materials 
Participants were shown a vignette (see Appendix section 1.1 for detail) in which a strawberry 
farmer, Ms. Russel, hosts workers on her farm during harvest time. The lodgings, which are on 
Ms. Russel’s grounds, are close to a river, which flooded two years ago. Though Ms. Russel took 
precautions the previous years against potential flooding (none occurred), this year she believes 
there will be no flood and uses the budget to refurbish the kitchens of the workers’ houses instead. 
The vignette came with one of two endings (labels in bold omitted):  
 
Neutral: As during the previous years, the river’s water supply is low all season and it 
never overflows. The fruit pickers are glad that the money has been invested into the 
refurbishment of the kitchens. 
 
Bad: It just so happens that there is a torrential downpour one night that nobody saw 
coming. The lodgings are flooded within hours. Several fruit pickers are severely injured 
and one worker and his two children die a slow and painful death as they get trapped in a 
flooded house. 
 
Thereafter, participants were asked to answer two questions concerning objective and subjective 
probability (on a scale from 0 to 100), as formulated above.   
In the experiment, we tested for two types of mens rea: recklessness and negligence (see 
MPC 2.02 (c) and (d), for the US, see e.g. Fletcher, 2000; for the UK, see e.g. Herring, 2012).  An 
agent acts recklessly, if she knowingly incurs a substantial risk. An agent acts negligently, if she 
should have been aware of a substantial risk. The scenario for our first experiments concerns the 
failure to install a protection against river flooding. Further down, we report experiments with a 
second scenario that focuses on speeding at an intersection (see section 7, and Appendix sections 
6-10). In principle, both scenarios could be treated either as recklessness or negligence cases. 
However, given the details of the situations described, they are best interpreted as negligence cases, 
because in both scenarios the agents evaluated the risk at hand as unsubstantial, whereas a 
reasonable person would have considered the said risks as substantial. Nonetheless, since there is 
evidence that laypeople frequently have difficulties differentiating between these two types of 
mens rea (Shen et al. 2011), we ran questions focusing on both negligence and recklessness. On a 
7-point Likert scale, participants had to report their agreement and disagreement with the following 
claims (labels in bold omitted):  
 
                                               
two experiments together (from a single Qualtrics survey). Given that prevention of ballot-box stuffing was turned on 
in Qualtrics, no participant could participate both in Experiment 1 and Experiment 3.  
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Recklessness: Ms. Russel was aware of a substantial risk of a flood occurring this year. (1= 
completely disagree; 7= completely agree) 
Negligence: Ms. Russel should have been aware of a substantial risk of a flood occurring 
this year. (1= completely disagree; 7= completely agree) 
 
Finally, we tested two types of moral judgment, blame and deserved punishment (cf. Cushman, 
2008; Kneer & Machery, 2019). The reason for this was twofold: First, punishment is known to 
be considerably more sensitive to outcomes than blame and, second, it is a variable which is 
directly relevant for legal contexts. The questions read (labels in bold omitted): 
  
Blame: To what extent is Ms. Russel blameworthy for not installing the flood protection 
this year?  (1 = not at all blameworthy; 7 = extremely blameworthy) 
Punishment: How much punishment does Ms. Russel deserve for not installing the flood 
protection this year? (1 = no punishment at all; 7 = very severe punishment) 
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Main Results 
Probabilities are most naturally reported in percentages (following our ordinary practices), rather 
than 7-point Likert scales. To improve ease of presentation, we rescaled all probabilities to fit the 
7-point Likert scales which we employ for the measurement of mens rea and the moral variables. 
The mean ratings for all dependent variables are presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean ratings for probability, mens rea and moral judgment for the between-subjects 
design (outcome: neutral v. bad). Error bars denote standard error of the mean. 
Consistent with previous research (Cushman 2008; Cushman et al, 2009; Gino et al, 2009; Gino 
et al, 2010; Young et al, 2010; Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012; Lench et al, 2015), there is a 












Obj. Probability Subj. Probability Recklessness Negligence Blame Punishment
neutral bad
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Appendix section 1.2), mens rea (see Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, 2017, Kneer & Machery, 2019) 
and perceived probability (Arkes et al, 1981, Dawson et al, 1988; Christensen-Szalanski & 
Willham, 1991; Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995; Kneer, 2021) both when assessed in objective and 
subjective terms (see Appendix, B.1.1). 
 
2.3.2 Mediation Analyses for Blame 
In order to explore whether the pattern proposed by Kneer & Machery (2019) replicates (see Figure 
2 above), we conducted a series of mediation analyses. A key novelty of our experiment is that we 
differentiate between subjective and objective probability, and that this might help to reveal the 
precise mechanics of the hindsight bias in more detail. We first conducted a multiple mediation 
analysis to explore which of the potential factors mediates the relation between outcome and 
blame. As shown by Figure 3, recklessness and objective probability proved nonsignificant. 
However, both subjective probability and negligence were significant mediators, and taking them 
into account rendered the impact of outcome on blame nonsignificant (p=.16).  
 
Figure 3: Mediation analysis with 5000 bootstrap samples of the relationship between outcome 
(neutral v. bad) and blame judgments by probability (objective and subjective), negligence and 
recklessness. 
 
A serial mediation analysis with subjective probability and negligence provides more clarity: the 
relation between outcome and blame is not mediated by negligence per se (the a2 path is 
nonsignificant). Instead, mediation through negligence travels through subjective probability (the 
a1db2 path is significant) and some of the mediation occurs via subjective probability 
independently of negligence (the a1b1 path is significant).  
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Figure 4: Mediation analysis with 5000 bootstrap samples of the relationship between outcome 
(neutral v. bad) and blame judgments by subjective probability and negligence. 
 
2.3.3 Mediation Analysis for Punishment 
Things are different concerning the moral DV of punishment. First, whereas accounting for the 
mediators in the blame analysis renders the c-path nonsignificant, suggesting near-complete 
mediation, mediation accounts only for about a third of the total effect of outcome on punishment, 
which remains significant (p<.001), see Figure 5. In contrast to blame, this suggests, punishment 
is strongly sensitive to outcome itself. Second, whereas in the blame analysis subjective probability 
played a key role besides negligence, it proves nonsignificant for punishment. Here, however, 
objective probability is a significant mediator besides negligence. A serial mediation model shows 
that all three mediation paths are significant, confirming that mediation accounts for about a third 
of the total effect of outcome on punishment. Objective probability by itself (the a1b1 path) 
accounts for more than half of the mediation (54%) cf. Figure 6.  
 
Figure 5: Mediation analysis with 5000 bootstrap samples of the relationship between outcome 






Figure 6: Mediation analysis with 5000 bootstrap samples of the relationship between outcome 
(neutral v. bad) and punishment judgments by objective probability and negligence. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
There is a pronounced outcome effect on both types of probability, mens rea, and the moral 
variables. The outcome effect on blame is mediated completely by subjective probability and 
negligence: People consider the harmful outcome more likely if it occurs and thus the unlucky 
agent more negligent and blameworthy than the lucky one. The effect of outcome on punishment, 
by contrast, is only partially mediated by objective probability and negligence. Importantly, about 
two thirds of the effect of outcome on punishment is direct (at least given the mediators we tested), 
and its impact remains significant even when taking the mediators into account.  
The findings not only reveal the mechanics of the outcome effect on two different measures 
of culpability, but they also shed light on Cushman’s (2008) influential Dual Process Model of 
Moral Judgment. According to this model, one process of moral judgment is strongly sensitive to 
mental states, whereas the other is predominantly sensitive to non-mental features of the action 
sequence. This is precisely what we find: For blame, what matters is the agent’s subjective 
situation, and its attribution is entirely mediated by the inculpating mental state of negligence.4 
Punishment, by contrast, is strongly sensitive to outcome. What is more, in so far as probability 
matters, it is not the likelihood of a harmful outcome as envisioned by the agent (a mental 
representation), but the objective probability that drives punishment judgments.5  
                                               
4 In the legal literature, negligence – i.e. that the agent should have been aware of a substantial risk – is frequently 
considered an “objective state” and distinguished from the “subjective states” of intention, knowledge and 
recklessness.  Whereas there is, of course, an important difference between holding someone culpable for the presence 
of inappropriate mental states v. the absence of appropriate ones, what matters is still their mental state, the attribution 
of which, furthermore, is contingent on their particular epistemic context.  
5 Cushman argues that judgments concerning permissibility and wrongness depend primarily on mental states, whereas 
blame and punishment depend strongly on non-mental features. Like Kneer & Machery, 2019 we find blame to be 
more in the former category. Two things bear mentioning however: First, the exact status of blame is still contentious 
(see e.g. Prochownik & Cushman, ms; Frisch et al., ms). Second, and more importantly, no matter on which side of 
the fence blame falls, our findings show that the central thrust of Cushman’s Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment 
is correct – there are two very distinct processes of moral judgment.   
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People’s propensity to judge an outcome that has occurred more likely ex post than ex ante, 
or “creeping determinism” as Fischoff (1982) calls it, is near-universally considered a bias 
(Walster, 1967; Fischhoff, 1975 and 1980; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Agans & Shaffer, 1994; 
Hertwig et al, 1997; in the legal literature: Arkes & Schipani, 1994; Lowe & Reckers, 1994; 
Buchman, 2002). A similar assessment regards its downstream effects on inculpating mental states 
(Kneer & Machery, 2019) and judgments of culpability (Arkes, 1981; Casper et al., 1989; Wexler 
& Schopp, 1989; Bodenhausen, 1990; Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995, Rachlinski, 1998; more 
generally, see also Alicke, 2000). However, one should tread carefully here: Perhaps the folk 
concept of probability simply is, like the concept of punishment (Cushman, 2008; Kneer & 
Machery, 2019) strongly outcome-sensitive – without this constituting a bias. Differently put, 
perhaps the folk think that it is appropriate to take outcome into account when assessing 
probability, and hence doing so does not constitute a performance error. Returning to our opening 
example, one way to construe such a rationality view of outcome effects would be this: the 
likelihood of a fatal accident in Frank’s situation is reasonably judged higher post hoc than its 
probability in Su’s situation since Frank just did have an accident, whereas Su did not. Given that 
the notion of a risk is defined as the product of an event’s probability and the degree of harm 
occasioned, it thus follows that the risk incurred by Frank was higher than the risk incurred by Su. 
But if this is so, then it seems more warranted to contend that Frank should have been aware of a 
substantial risk than Su, inter alia because the risk incurred by Su might not have been substantial 
in the first place. So Frank is deemed more negligent, and consequently judged as more deserving 
of blame and punishment.  
How to adjudicate between the two views? In principle, if the folk concept of probability 
were outcome-dependent, then assessing two in all respects identical scenarios that differ only in 
terms of outcome side by side should lead to an asymmetry in perceived probability. For 
punishment, for instance, this is exactly what we tend to find. In within-subjects designs, in which 
the situational and mental features of two agents are held fixed and in which only outcomes differ, 
a robust outcome effect on punishment can be found. The folk concept of punishment, this implies, 
simply is outcome-dependent or consequentialist. For wrongness of an action or deserved blame, 
by contrast, a robust between-subjects difference across outcomes tends to vanish in within-
subjects experiments (Kneer & Machery, 2019). This suggests that the folk concepts of wrongness 
or blame are not consequentialist, though when evaluating just a single case, we tend to draw 
strong, most likely inappropriate, inferences from outcome to wrongness or blame. In the 
following experiment, we will put all three types of variables so far explored to the test in a within-
subjects design to gain some insight as to the bias question.  
 
3. Experiment 2 Within-subjects design 
 
The goal of experiment 2 was to explore whether the effect of outcome on probability constitutes 
a bias, as is near-universally assumed, or whether the folk concept of probability might be sensitive 
to the (occurrence and nonoccurrence) of outcomes (Hsee, 1996, Rachlinski, 1998, 2000, Baron 
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& Ritov, 2004; Hsee & Zhan, 2004, Baron, 2010). To do this, we ran the Flood Scenario in a 
within-subjects design.  
 
3.1 Participants 
96 participants were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address location was 
restricted to the USA. As preregistered,6 participants who failed the attention check or the 
comprehension question were excluded, as well as those who were not native speakers of the 
English language or finished the entire survey (including demographic questionnaire) in under two 
minutes. A sample of 84 participants remained (female: 51%; age M=46 years, SD = 14 years, 
range: 23-74 years). 
  
3.2 Methods and Materials 
Participants were presented with both outcome conditions of the Flood vignette side-by-side. To 
facilitate presentation, one farm owner was called Ms. Russel, the other Ms. Miller. Having read 
both vignettes, participants had to rate probabilities (subjective and objective), mens rea 
(negligence and recklessness) and moral judgment (blame and punishment) for both agents. To 
encourage a comparative assessment, the questions always mentioned both agents. The blame 
questions, for instance, read “To what extent are Ms. Russel and Ms. Miller blameworthy for their 
actions, if at all?”. Participants had to rate Ms. Russel’s action, and thereafter Ms. Miller’s action, 




Mean ratings across outcome, effect sizes and results of paired-samples t-tests for all six DVs are 
presented in Figure 7 (for t-test details, see Appendix 2.2). Except for objective probability, we 
found a significant difference for all dependent variables (all ps<.049), though subjective 
probability just barely makes the threshold. Importantly, however, the effects sizes for all variables 
are much lower than a between-subjects design, and small for all variables except blame and 
punishment. For blame, the effect size decreased from d=.70 (between-subjects) to d=.49 (within-
subjects), for punishment it decreased from d=1.18 to d=.63.  
 
                                               
6 Link to preregistration: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=42tv63 
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Figure 7: Mean probability, mens rea and moral responsibility judgments for the within-subjects 
design in the two conditions (neutral vs. bad outcome). Effect sizes are given in terms of Cohen’s 
d, significance is reported at the p<.05 threshold (for details, see Appendix). Error bars denote 
standard error of the mean. 
Despite the considerable decrease in outcome effect size, one might be astonished by the fact that 
the effect of outcome on mens rea and moral judgment is still significant in the within-subjects 
design. As argued by Kneer & Machery (2019), however, it might be instructive to look at the 
proportions of participants who manifest a Difference Intuition across the two situations (neutral 
v. bad) in the within-subjects design, i.e. who judge the two situations and agents differently with 
respect to probability, mens rea and morality. As Figure 8 illustrates, a substantial majority (more 
than 60%) judges the two situations/agents identically across all variables except punishment 
(49%); all being significantly above chance (binomial tests, all ps<.022, two-tailed) except 
punishment and objective probability (both ps>.062). As concerns punishment, this is no surprise. 
It is well established (Cushman, 2008, Kneer & Machery, 2019, see also mediation analyses above) 















Obj. Probability Subj. Probability Recklessness Negligence Blame Punishment
Neutral outcome Bad outcome
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Figure 8: Proportions of participants who judged probabilities, mens rea, blame and punishment 
identically (no Difference Intuition) across scenarios. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals, 
Wilson method, see Brown, Cai, & DasGupta, 2001.  
We would have expected the proportions of identical ratings of subjective probability, and 
particularly objective probability, to be higher. The reason, we’d like to suggest, is simply the 
response mechanism. We used the Qualtrics slider-scale (pictured in the Appendix, 2.2.2) and it is 
quite hard to indicate a precise probability, in particular on a mobile device. Once the criterion for 
identical probabilities is relaxed to include probabilities with a maximum 5-point (out of 100) 
difference – which would be nonsignificant – the proportion of identical assessments for objective 
probability is 79% and for subjective probability it is 80%, both significantly above chance 
(binomial tests, ps<.001). These figures – roughly four of five participants – squares with the 
proportions of identical assessment of mens rea, which are the same. Note that if perceived 
probabilities were indeed quite different, it would make little sense to rate mens rea identically in 
the scenario at hand.7 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The results of the experiment are relatively clear. Even in a design where people see both scenarios 
side-by-side, and should thus become aware that the only difference consists in outcome, 
punishment ratings across cases differ significantly and manifest a medium-sized effect (d=.63). 
In line with previous findings (Cushman, 2008; Martin & Cushman, 2015, 2016, Kneer & 
Machery, 2019), this suggests that the folk concept of punishment is outcome-sensitive. Note that, 
on this view, the outcome effect (neutral v. bad) per se in the between-subjects design should not 
be regarded as a bias. However, its size – it’s nearly twice as pronounced in a between-subjects 
                                               
7 Naturally, this would not hold for a case where probabilities are extremely low or high, yet different, since then we 







Obj. Probability Subj. Probability Recklessness Negligence Blame Punishment
 14 
design, amounting to a very large effect – might indeed be taken to be, at least in parts, the 
consequence of a performance error.  
Things are different as regards objective probability (not significant) and subjective 
probability (barely significant). For negligence and recklessness, we find a significant effect, 
though for both probabilities and mens rea, the effect sizes are very small. What is more, once we 
have corrected for the technical problem of the slider scale, about 80% of participants rate the 
probabilities and mens reas identically across cases, which suggests that the folk concepts of 
objective and subjective probability, as well as those of recklessness and negligence are outcome-
independent. For blame, the findings are not quite as clear. The difference is significant, and there’s 
a medium-sized effect (d=.49). However, here, too, a significant majority holds that the two agents 
deserve the same amount of blame. Taken together, we consider the results of Experiment 2 to 
constitute evidence in favour of the view that the folk concepts of probability (both objective and 
subjective) and mens rea are outcome-independent (cf. Spellman & Kincannon, 2001; Gilbert et 
al, 2015; Schauer & Spellman, 2020), and tentative evidence for the outcome-insensitivity of the 
folk-concept of blame. Consequently, we suggest to regard the substantial outcome effects on all 
dependent variables – except punishment – in between-subjects design as performance errors.  
 
4. Study 3: Anchoring Probability 
In the next study, we explore whether the hindsight bias and its downstream effects can be 
mitigated. One way to do this consists in having participants assess the probability of a potentially 
harmful consequence ex ante, that is, before the outcome is revealed. The point of this is to anchor 
people’s probability perception to a level unbiased by outcome, and to explore whether a priming 




We recruited 199 participants online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address location was 
restricted to the USA. As preregistered,8 participants who were not native speakers of the English 
language, took less than two minutes to complete the entire survey, failed the attention check or 
the comprehension question were excluded, leaving a sample of 175 participants (female: 62%; 
mean age: 42 years, SD = 12 years, range: 19–82 years). 
 
4.2 Methods and Materials 
The experimental design was identical to the one familiar from Experiment 1, except for one small 
change: Participants first read the general scenario and had to rate the objective and subjective 
probability of a flood that year. Subsequently, outcomes were revealed, and participants had to 
rate the objective and subjective probabilities again, as well as mens rea (recklessness and 
negligence) and culpability (blame and punishment), see Figure 9.  
 





Figure 9: Experimental design for Experiment 1 (no anchoring) and for Experiment 3 (probability 
anchoring). The question regarding the probabilities of the bad outcome’s possible occurrence 
were asked before the outcome was revealed. 
4.3 Results 
Expectedly, perceived objective and subjective probabilities ex ante (i.e. before the outcome was 
revealed) across conditions do not differ significantly (independent samples t-test ps>.640). We 
found a significant main effect of outcome (all ps<.004) on the moral variables (blame, 
punishment), mens rea (negligence) and perceived probability, both when assessed in objective 
and subjective terms, cf. Figure 10 and Table 1 (anchoring). Only for recklessness was the main 




Figure 10: Mean ratings of probabilities, mens rea and moral judgments across outcomes (neutral 























 No anchoring Anchoring 
 t(167) p Cohen's d 95% CI t(173) p Cohen's d 95% CI 
Obj. Probability 4.31 <.001 .66 [.45;1.22] - 3.72 <.001 .57 [-1.06;-.33] 
Subj. Probability 5.07 <.001 .78 [.73;1.67] - 3.23 .001 .49 [-1.24;-.30] 
Recklessness 2.14 .034 .33 [.45;1.12] - .78 .435 .12 [-.76;.33] 
Negligence 3.96 <.001 .61 [.48;1.45] - 3.02 .003 .46 [-1.27;-.27] 
Blame 4.53 <.001 .70 [.72;1.83] - 3.71 <.001 .56 [-1.54;-.47] 
Punishment 3.82 <.001 1.18 [1.45;2.45] - 5.47 <.001 .83 [-1.84;-.86] 
Table 1: Effect of outcome on probabilities, mens rea and moral judgment in the no anchoring 
design (Experiment 1) and with probability anchoring (Experiment 3). 
 
The data for Experiment 3 was purposefully gathered jointly with the data for Experiment 1. Given 
that people were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of the two experiments (ballot-
box stuffing was prevented), nobody had seen any other condition before. This allowed us to 
explore whether anchoring reduced the outcome effect on probability judgments in contrast to the 
results where participants did not have to rate subjective and objective probability ex ante. For 
none of the six DVs could we find a significant main effect of anchoring (all ps>.130), or a 
significant anchoring*outcome interaction (all ps>.089), see Appendix 3.2.2. We do, however, see 
a small reduction in effect size in the anchoring design for probability ratings in contrast to an 
anchoring-free design (Experiment 1). Consistent with our previous findings according to which 
outcome effects on mens rea and moral culpability are mediated by probability, the effect sizes for 
negligence decrease and turn nonsignificant for recklessness; they also decrease for blame and 
punishment, see Table 1.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
Anchoring, we have shown, is not a quick fix to the distorting effects of outcome on perceived 
probability, and the latter’s downstream effects on mens rea and moral judgment (contrary to the 
findings of Karlovac & Darley, 1988, and in line with the results of Kamin & Rachlinsky, 1995). 
Even with anchoring, outcome still has medium-sized effects on both kinds of probability, as well 
as negligence and blame. Expectedly, the effect size of outcome on punishment remains large even 
with anchoring, since outcome has a strong direct effect on punishment (see section 4.3).  
 
5. Experiment 4 Counterfactual priming 
So far, a number of things have been established: First, in between-subjects experiments, outcome 
has a significant effect on perceived probability, mens rea and moral judgment. Second, mediation 
analyses suggest that the difference in perceived subjective probability drives the asymmetry in 
the downstream assessment of negligence and blame. Third, the hindsight effect must be 
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considered a bias: In within-subjects designs, a significant majority of participants does not draw 
an inference from outcome to its likelihood, and the differences in mens rea and blame are strongly 
reduced. Fourth, probability anchoring is only moderately successful in mitigating the hindsight 
bias and its downstream effects.  
With this knowledge at hand, we will turn to another potential debiasing strategy. 
Developing on Experiment 2, we will take a cue from the within-subjects design: Although it 
basically presents two distinct actual outcomes that have come to pass side-by-side, perhaps a 
similar result can be found when people are simply encouraged to consider the relevant 
counterfactuals. Moral luck experiments by Lench et al. (2015), for instance, suggest, that this 
strategy can have an effect on moral judgment (probability and mens rea were not tested).  
 
5.1 Participants 
396 participants were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address location was 
restricted to the USA. Participants who were not native speakers of the English language, failed 
the attention check, the comprehension question or took less than two minutes to complete the 
whole survey (including demographics) were excluded. The remaining sample comprised of 321 
participants (female: 47%; mean age: 43 years, SD =12 years, range: 22-88 years).9 
 
5.2 Methods and Materials 
Lench and colleagues asked participants to imagine some alternative outcome. However, content 
type – and in particular the severity of the counterfactual outcome – are best controlled tightly. 
Using the Flood Scenario, we thus imitated a design by Spranca et al. (1991), who give two 
different possible endings to a story (one neutral, one bad), and tell people which outcome actually 
comes to pass. The experiment thus took a 2 (outcome: neutral v. bad) x 2 (counterfactual priming: 
no v. yes) design. Participants saw one out of 4 conditions: A story with two endings, one being 
specified as the actual one (neutral v. bad); or else a story with just a single ending (neutral v. bad).  
 
5.3 Results 
Contrasting the results of the neutral v. bad outcome in the plain conditions (i.e. no counterfactual 
priming) replicates the findings from Experiment 1: We find a significant, and pronounced 
outcome effect on all DVs (all ps<.005, all ds>.45), see Appendix 4.3.1 and Figure 11. A series of 
2 outcome (neutral v. bad) x 2 priming (yes v. no) ANOVAs revealed a significant main effect of 
outcome on all the dependent variables (Table 2),10, a nonsignificant main effect of priming (all 
ps>.169) except for recklessness (p=.022). The outcome*priming interactions were significant for 
subjective probability (p=.006), the two types of mens rea (ps<.040), and punishment (p=.003). 
                                               
9 Though we originally planned to report each outcome as a separate experiment, for ease of exposition we’ll report 
them together. The preregistration links are https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=e2hq4x and 
https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=n8iq3t. Participants who took both surveys were excluded. For detailed 
documentation, see Appendix, Section 4.  
10 For details, see Appendix, Section 4.3.1.  
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The effect sizes for subjective probability and punishment were substantial (hp2>.22). Figure 11 
graphically represents the findings.  
 
 outcome priming outcome*priming 
 df F p hp2 df F p hp2 df F p hp2 
Obj. probability 1 13.88 <.001 .042 1 3.28 .170 .006 1 1.27 .261 .004 
Subj. probability 1 22.14 <.001 .065 1 1.55 .433 .002 1 7.61 .006 .023 
Recklessness 1 4.59 .033 .014 1 17.63 .022 .016 1 4.31 .039 .013 
Negligence 1 10.14 .002 .031 1 3.15 .322 .003 1 4.68 .031 .015 
Blame 1 39.86 <.001 .112 1 4.35 .251 .004 1 3.40 .066 .011 
Punishment 1 52.68 <.001 .143 1 10.45 .059 .011 1 9.21 .003 .028 
Table 2: Results of the 2 outcome (neutral v. bad) x 2 priming (yes v. no) ANOVAs for 
probabilities, mens rea and moral judgment.  
 
 
Figure 11: Mean ratings for probabilities, mens rea and moral judgment across outcomes for the 
priming and no priming conditions. Effect sizes are given in terms of Cohen’s d, significance is 
reported at the p<.05 threshold (for details, see Appendix section 4.3.1). Error bars denote standard 
error of the mean.  
 
Counterfactual priming decreases the difference across outcomes (Figure 11, for details see 
Appendix 4.3.1), rendering the outcome effect nonsignificant for all variables, except for blame 
and punishment (both ps=.002). Importantly, however, counterfactual priming also decreases the 
effect size of outcome on moral judgment dramatically in comparison to the between-subjects 


























Recklessness Negligence Blame Punishment
No Priming Counterfactual Priming
Neutral outcome Bad outcome
 19 
5.4 Discussion 
Asking people to imagine a counterfactual outcome strongly reduces the outcome effect on blame 
and punishment, and renders it nonsignificant for objective and subjective probability, recklessness 
and negligence. Counterfactual priming does not completely eradicate the outcome effect of either 
moral variable tested, though the effect is much smaller for both blame and punishment. What is 
notable again is that, despite the fact that the folk concept of punishment does seem outcome-
dependent (see Experiment 2), there might yet be a bias in the extent to which outcome drives 
punishment judgments when unchecked. As in the within-subjects design, entertaining 
counterfactual consequences reduces the size of the outcome effect on punishment by more than 
half (from d=1.22 in a between-subjects design to d=.44).  
As discussed (and graphically represented in Figure 1), our first two debiasing experiments 
attempted to reduce the impact of outcome on perceived probability ex post. Differently put, we 
explored indirect mechanisms to reduce the hindsight bias and its downstream effects on mens rea 
attribution and moral judgment. In certain contexts, however, one could attempt to directly 
influence perceived probability ex post. The evident way to do this is by consulting an expert. The 
question then arises whether probability stabilizing of this sort does indeed mitigate the outcome 
effect on mens rea and moral judgment, as our mediation results (as well as those reported by 
Kneer & Machery, 2019) would suggest. To this final debiasing strategy we now turn.  
 
6. Experiment 5: Stabilizing Probability 
Many of our decisions are characterized by uncertainty – that is, undertaken in circumstances 
where it is impossible to quantify the probabilities of an event (be it ex ante or ex post). In contexts 
of risk, by contrast, the relevant probabilities of an event’s coming to pass can, at least in principle, 
and roughly, be specified ex ante. In situations where serious harm has occurred – i.e. cases that 
tend to end up in court – one might thus want to consult an expert to determine the probability of 
harm engendered by the agent’s actions. Although not a standard procedure in risk-related cases 
in court, the law sometimes resorts to experts, e.g. for assessing risk of harm in road traffic offenses 
or recidivism of those with mental health disorders (cf. Herring 2012; Fletcher 2000). Given the 
robustness of the hindsight bias, and the fact that it is quite resistant against certain debiasing 
strategies such as the above-reported probability anchoring (Experiment 3), our final experiment 
explores whether probability stabilizing by expert testimony is indeed a promising strategy to keep 
creeping determinism and its downstream consequences at bay.  
 
6.1 Participants 
238 participants were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address location was 
restricted to the USA. As preregistered,11 participants who were not native English speakers, failed 
the attention check, the comprehension question, or took less than two minutes to complete the 
whole survey (including demographics), were excluded. The remaining sample comprised of 169 
participants (female: 47%; mean age: 42 years, SD =11 years, range: 22-74 years). 




6.2 Methods and Materials  
We used the same scenario as in Experiment 1: Ms. Russel did not install temporary flood barriers 
to protect her workers’ homes so as to refurbish their kitchens instead. In the original version, 
participants were presented with either the neutral or the severe outcome, and then asked to rate 
probability, mens rea and culpability. But in this version, both groups were presented with the 
following additional information before responding to the questions: 
 
The case of Ms. Russel not installing the temporary flood barriers is brought to court. An 
expert witness states that there was a 5% chance that there would be a flood this year. 
 
The questions, focusing on objective and subjective probability, mens rea and moral judgment, 
were the same as in the previous experiments (full details in the Appendix 5.2.1).  
 
6.3 Results 
Probability stabilizing via expert testimony works: When there is an explicit specification of the 
flood’s likelihood at the context of action, people view objective probability identically across 
outcomes (p=.487, d=.10), and the same holds for subjective probability (p=.074, d=.25), see 
Figure 12 (detailed test results in Appendix 5.2.1). Consistent with the mediation analyses from 
Experiment 1, ensuring that perceived probability is fixed across conditions cancels out the 
outcome effect on the two types of mens rea (recklessness: p=.853, d=.03; negligence: p=.094, 
d=.28). Expectedly, the ratings for punishment, a DV which is strongly and directly sensitive to 
outcome, remained significant across conditions (p<.001, d=.63). Less expectedly, the outcome 
effect on blame also remained significant (p=.017, d=.38), however its effect size was small. 
Notably, the effect size for both moral DVs was cut in half by probability stabilizing.  
 
 
Figure 12: Mean ratings for probabilities, mens rea and moral judgment across outcomes for the 
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reported at the p<.05 threshold (for details, see Appendix 5.2.1). Error bars denote standard error 
of the mean.  
 
6.4 Discussion 
An expert assessment of the actual ex ante probability of a harmful outcome cancels out the 
hindsight bias. Since (at least in the experiments at hand) it is distorted post-hoc probability that 
mediates the outcome effect on mens rea, we would expect that these, too, are now assessed 
identically across conditions. And indeed they are – we found no significant difference across 
negligence or recklessness ascriptions. As predicted, judgments of deserved punishment differed 
significantly across outcomes even after probability stabilizing. Somewhat astonishingly, blame 
was also significant across outcomes (neutral v. bad), though this effect cannot be due to diverging 
assessments of probability or mens rea. Blame, this suggests (and the mediation analysis from 
Experiment 1 does, too), is to some, relatively small, extent also directly sensitive to outcome (at 
least in a between-subjects experiment of this sort). Note, however, that for both punishment and 
blame probability stabilizing reduced the outcome effect by about 50%, and the remaining effect 
of outcome on blame was small (d=.38). As in the previous experiments, the story regarding 
punishment replicates: The folk concept of punishment, we said, is outcome-sensitive 
(Experiments 1 and 2). However, it is likely that folk judgments of punishment can easily fall prey 
to a bias when it comes to the extent to which outcome information is taken into consideration. 
Probability stabilizing offsets much of that bias, and thus reduces the impact of outcome on 




For ease of exposition, we have worked with a single root scenario throughout this paper. However, 
we have run the entire suite of experiments with a different scenario, keeping all the parameters 
(question phrasing, design, exclusion criteria etc.) the same. In the vignette, adapted from Spranca 
et al. (1991, Experiment 1, p. 83), John tests a recently fixed car on a standardly deserted highway, 
speeding through an intersection. In the neutral outcome condition, no other cars are in sight. In 
the bad outcome condition, John hits another car and injures the driver. The questions once again 
focused on subjective and objective probability, negligence, recklessness, blame and punishment. 
Full details of the scenario, questions and results are provided in the Appendix (sections 6-10). 
Since pretty much everything replicated perfectly, we’ll here limit ourselves to a short overview 
of the findings. To facilitate a quick grasp of the results for the reader, we have produced two 
figures that graphically represent the effect sizes in terms of Cohen’s d and state significance across 
conditions for all five experiments. Figure 13 reports outcome effects on perceived probabilities 
and mens rea, Figure 14 reports outcome effects on perceived probabilities, blame and punishment. 
Replicating Experiments 1 and 4 (between-subjects data, see Appendix 7.3.1), we found a 
significant impact of outcome for all DVs except recklessness (p=.769), and similar effect sizes. 
The mediation analyses also replicated well (see Appendix, section 6.3.2-6.3.3): A serial mediation 
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model suggests that the effect of outcome on blame travels entirely via subjective probability first 
and negligence thereafter (the individual mediating paths of subjective probability and negligence 
proved nonsignificant).12 As in Experiment 1, once mediation is taken into account, the effect of 
outcome on blame turns nonsignificant. Also replicating the findings from Experiment 1, the 
mediation analyses for punishment differed from blame in two regards: First, it was objective 
probability which played a role (directly and indirectly via negligence) whereas subjective 
probability did not. Second, most of the effect – about three quarters – of outcome on punishment 
is direct. Once again, these findings confirm Cushman’s proposal that there are two different 
processes of moral judgment, one more dependent on mental factors (of which subjective 
probability is a part), and one more dependent on causal factors (objective probability and outcome 
per se). 
Experiment 7 successfully replicated Experiment 2, in which we explored whether 
between-subjects outcome effects on probability, mens rea and blame (though not punishment) are 
best understood as a bias. When people see both outcomes side-by-side, the rationale was, they are 
aware that they differ only in terms of outcome, and will only assign different probabilities, mens 
rea or blame if they think the latter should be sensitive to outcome. Experiment 7 confirmed that, 
by and large, they do not think the respective DVs should be sensitive to outcome. Though some 
variables just made the significance threshold, all effect sizes were very small (all ds<.28). 
Importantly (and as in Kneer & Machery, 2019), the effects were driven by a small minority of 
participants, since the vast majority judged the two situations (neutral v. bad) identically with 
respect to objective probability (72%), subjective probability (78%), recklessness (93%), 
negligence (90%) and blame (86%). Only punishment proved – expectedly – outcome-sensitive 
properly conceived. There was a significant effect of outcome (p<.001, d=.74), and only 48% of 
the participants judged the two agents as deserving the same punishment.  
Replicating Experiment 3, having people reflect on the probabilities before outcomes were 
revealed decreased the outcome effect. In fact, anchoring worked a little better than in Experiment 
3, since the effect of outcome turned nonsignificant for all but the moral variables. Anchoring 
reduced the outcome effect on punishment (from d=1.45 to d=.91), whereas the effect remained 
roughly the same for blame (d=.52 v. d=.68 with anchoring).  
Following Lench et al. (2015), Experiment 9 explored whether asking people to entertain 
an alternative outcome is a helpful strategy to mitigate the hindsight bias. Once again, we found 
that it is: The outcome effect on both types of probability, negligence and blame disappears entirely 
(all ps>.155). As expected, punishment remained significant (p<.001, d=.91). Curiously, 
recklessness was also significant (p=.013, d=.42). Given that recklessness was not significant in 
any of the other Intersection experiments, including the between-subjects design (p=.769, d=.05), 
we think this might perhaps just be an oddity in the data.  
Finally, we reran the probability stabilizing strategy explored in Experiment 5 with the 
Intersection scenario (Experiment 10). Replicating the exact same pattern which we found in 
                                               
12 In Experiment 1, subjective probability picked up a bit of the indirect effect by itself, but the bulk of the mediation 
occurred via probability-and-negligence (i.e. the a1db2 path), as in Experiment 6. 
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Experiment 8, probabilities and negligence turned nonsignificant (all ps>.149). Once again, blame 
remained significant (p=.018) and – expectedly – so did punishment (p<.001). Importantly, 
though, here too, the effect sizes decreased in comparison to the between-subjects (priming-free) 
experiment for blame (no priming: d=.52, probability stabilizing. d=.40) and punishment (no 
priming d=1.45, probability stabilizing d=1.12).  
 
 
Figure 13: Effect sizes and significance of the difference between the assessment of perceived 
probabilities and mens rea across outcomes (neutral v. bad) for all five Intersection experiments. 
Effect sizes are given in terms of Cohen’s ds, significance is reported at the p<.05 threshold. 
 
 
Figure 14: Effect sizes and significance of the difference between the assessment of probabilities, 
blame and punishment across outcomes (neutral v. bad) for all five Intersection experiments. Effect 
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8. General Discussion  
8.1 Outcome Effects on Punishment and Blame 
Across all ten experiments, punishment proved strongly sensitive to outcome. This is consistent 
with previous findings (Cushman, 2008; Martin & Cushman, 2015, 2016, Kneer & Machery, 2019) 
and suggests that the folk concept of punishment is outcome-dependent: Even in our within-
subjects designs, the severity of the consequence is a decisive factor in adjudicating deserved 
punishment. The effect of outcome on blame, by contrast is nonsignificant (Experiment 2) or 
marginal (Experiment 6, d=.27) in within-subjects designs. From this we can draw several 
conclusions. 
First, the findings confirm Cushman’s Dual Process Model of Moral Judgment. There are 
two distinct moral processes, one which is fundamentally more sensitive to causal factors such as 
outcome (judging deserved punishment), and another which is fundamentally less sensitive to them 
(blame) yet more sensitive to mental factors (see mediation analyses in Experiments 1 and 6).13  
Second, the fact that the pronounced between-subjects outcome effect on blame disappears 
by and large in the within-subjects design suggests it’s a bias. While this is commonly claimed,14 
few authors back this claim up convincingly. Our within-subjects data demonstrates that the folk 
concept of probability is not outcome-dependent, and that the effect of outcome in between-
subjects data constitutes a distortion even from the folk perspective (not just from a perspective of 
rational choice theory or some such).   
Third, and in line with previous arguments (Kneer & Machery, 2019; Frisch et al. ms), 
there is no philosophical puzzle of moral luck. What puzzles philosophers is that, on the one hand, 
we do not want to hold people morally responsible for consequences beyond their control. On the 
other, however, we allegedly blame unlucky agents more than lucky ones when directly contrasting 
the two cases (Nagel, 1979, Williams, 1981; Hartman,2017, for a review see Nelkin, 2006). But – 
as the within-subjects design data shows – most of us simply do not blame the two agents 
differently (for similar results see e.g. Nichols, 2009; Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012; Lench et 
al. 2015, Kneer & Machery, 2019). So there’s no puzzle. Or is there? Perhaps on the basis that, 
even in within-subjects designs, we find a strong outcome effect on punishment (Kumar, 2019, for 
instance always speaks of “blame and punishment” in the same breath)? We doubt it. As argued 
by Enoch & Marmor (2007), not just any vaguely “blame-related” moral variable is suited to get 
a substantial philosophical puzzle of moral luck off the ground. Punishment has a host of pragmatic 
functions (e.g. the deterrence of potential offenders, as well as the incapacitation and/or 
                                               
13 Cushman (2008) tested four types of moral judgment: Wrongness and permissibility of an action, as well as the 
blame and punishment the agent deserves. In his experiments, wrongness and permissibility are predominantly 
sensitive to mental states, whereas blame and punishment are also strongly influenced by causal factors, notably 
outcome. Here, as in Kneer & Machery (2019), blame seems to fall on the mental, rather than the causal, side of the 
fence. The difference could be due to the formulations of the blame question (“is blameworthy” v. “deserves blame”), 
or its focus (it can focus on agent, action or consequence), a topic which merits further investigation (see Prochownik 
& Cushman, ms; Björnson & Kneer, ms).  
14 For work on the hindsight bias, see e.g. Fischoff, 1977; Alicke, 1989, 1994, 2008; Arkes et al 1981; Arkes et al 
1988; Bukszar & Conolly, 1988; Spranca et al.1989; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; LaBine & LaBine, 1996; Bradfield & 
Wells, 2005, Wood, 1978; Rachlinski, 1998, 2000; Baron, 2006, Blank et al. 2008, Ackerman et al. 2020. 
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rehabilitation of previous offenders, see e.g. Duff, 2001) that go beyond moral assessment, and it 
is quite likely those factors that make the concept of punishment sensitive to outcome.15 
 
8.2 Alleviating the outcome bias 
We have argued that the folk-concept of punishment is outcome-sensitive, whereas the concept of 
blame is not. In ordinary life situations and in court, outcome information might thus distort 
ascriptions of moral or legal culpability. What, exactly, is it that drives the outcome effect? 
Consistent with previous findings, the mediation analysis suggests that the outcome effect on 
culpability is in large parts a consequence of the hindsight bias (see Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995, 
Rachlinski, 1998, 2000; Kneer & Machery, 2019): Participants view the subjective and objective 
likelihood of possible events that actually come to pass as higher ex post than those that do not 
come to pass. In virtue of the higher perceived risk in the unlucky cases (where the harm does 
occur), people judge the agents as more negligent and (sometimes) more reckless. Consequently 
(and reasonably), they deem the agent who is viewed as acting more negligently as more 
blameworthy. Once subjective probability and negligence are accounted for as mediators, 
however, no direct effects of outcome on blame remain.  
We have explored three distinct ways to alleviate the hindsight bias and its downstream 
effects on mens rea ascription and blame. What worked best was probability stabilizing. Lawsuits 
where the focus lies on the question whether the agent should have avoided a substantial risk, for 
instance cases of medical malpractice,16 sometimes employ experts to establish whether there was 
a substantial risk in the first place (and how pronounced it was). We tested explicit probability 
stabilizing and found that it blocks the asymmetric assessments of the perceived likelihood of a 
harmful outcome across cases. Once the hindsight bias is thus stopped in its tracks, the outcome 
effect on mens rea disappears entirely, and only small direct effects of outcome on blame remain 
(Flood d=.38, Intersection d=.40). Interestingly, the effect of outcome on punishment is also 
reduced for both scenarios (in Flood by about 50%, though less in Intersection).  
An alternative strategy we tested was consulting people on probability ex ante (i.e. before 
the outcome was revealed), so as to anchor their perceived probabilities by estimates not yet 
distorted by outcome. This reduces the effect size of outcome both on subjective probability and 
                                               
15 Naturally, judgments of deserved punishment have some moral component. But note that the effect sizes across 
lucky v. unlucky conditions in the within-subjects design, as well as some of the debiasing strategies are only about 
half as pronounced as in the between-subjects design. 
16 See e.g. Arkes et al., 1981; Cohen 2004; Johnston 2013. Some medical malpractice legal cases of interest are: Johns 
Hopkins v. Genda, 1969 (the court stated that without expert evidence the defendant cannot be convicted and 
proclaimed him innocent); Claar v. Burlington, 1994 (discussing which expert testimony is admissible); Ambrosini v. 
Labaraque, 1996 (the court stated that expert evidence was defective and assessed standards of such evidence); 
Navarro v. Austin 2006 (expert witness testimony helped plaintiff receive one of the largest compensations in history); 
Griffen v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr.-Braddock Hospital, 2008 (discussing what is the probability threshold 
established by an expert witness which evidence must “reach” in a medical malpractice case, arguing that 51% is not 
enough); Day v. Bryant, 2010 (arguing that it is not enough that an expert establishes that harm is ‘more likely than 
not’). For an assessment of the practice of expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases and a clarification of the 
guidelines and responsibilities of expert witnesses as well as independent medical evaluators cf. Masella & Meister, 
2001; Friston, 2005; Hammond & Schwarz, 2005; Schofferman, 2007.  
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objective probability (in Intersection they turn nonsignificant, in Flood they remain significant), 
and consequently on mens rea (only negligence in Flood remains significant, but the effect is small, 
d=.26). In the Flood scenario, these decreases in effect size on probability and mens rea trickle 
down to blame, though not in Intersection.  
The impact of probability anchoring was significant, though limited. Taking inspiration 
from Lench et al. (2015), we explored whether entertaining counterfactuals reduces the hindsight 
bias and its downstream effects on mens rea and blame. The results suggest it does: After 
counterfactual priming, we can no longer detect a significant difference in objective and subjective 
probability across cases, or in negligence ascriptions with either scenario. For the Intersection 
scenario, blame, too, turns nonsignificant; for Flood, the effect remains significant, though 
decreases in size vis-à-vis the between-subjects experiment.  
Taking stock: Although the hindsight bias is robust, pervasive and its consequences can be 
daunting (for a review, see Rachlinski, 1998), there are measures that can be taken. Whereas the 
practical import of probability anchoring is small (since it is hard to effect, e.g. in a court case), 
both probability stabilizing and prompting people to entertain alternative outcomes hold a lot of 
promise. They block the hindsight bias, the distorted ascription of risk-related types of mens rea 
(negligence and recklessness) and decrease the outcome bias on blame substantially or cancel it 
out. Interestingly, in all three bias alleviation experiments, the impact of outcome on punishment 
is also reduced, though a pronounced, and significant effect remains. What this suggests is the 
following: Although the folk concept is sensitive to outcome, and although the asymmetric 
punishment attributions across cases do thus not constitute a bias per se, its size might be the 
consequence of a partial outcome bias. In the within-subjects designs, the effect of outcome on 
punishment is only about half that of the between-subjects designs, and the alleviation strategies 
manage to correct the effect downwards to a substantial degree.  
 
8.3 Implications for the Law 
The scenarios here tested are negligence cases, and the data suggests that the folk understands 
them as such (cf. two interesting studies on folk understanding of mens rea terms by Shen et al. 
2011 and Ginther et al. 2014). In negligence cases, the question is whether the agent should have 
been aware of a substantial risk of harm or not (see e.g. Model Penal Code, 2.02. (d), and for 
discussion of negligence more generally, Hall 1963, Hart, 1968, Fletcher, 1971, Simons, 1994, 
Hurd & Moore, 2002, 2011, King, 2009, Raz, 2010, and Husak, 2011). The law is explicit about 
the fact that what matters for the assessment of negligence is the risk as assessed from the point of 
view of a reasonable person at the context of action, not the risk as it appears post-hoc, once it is 
clear what turn the events have taken (for discussion, see Rachlinski, 1998, and Kneer, 
forthcoming). The hindsight bias, and the here demonstrated pronounced distortive effects on 
perceived negligence and culpability are thus a serious problem from the legal point of view. Since 
in many countries, such as inter alia the US and the UK, the mens rea question is decided by lay 
jurors, serious precautions should be taken to minimize the hindsight bias. Our examination of 
different debiasing strategies constitutes a first step in the quest for offsetting the systematic 
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performance error afflicting probability judgments post hoc, and the unjust rulings they are likely 
to engender.  
 One note of caution is, however, in order. Given the powerful influence an expert 
assessment of ex ante likelihood exerts on mens rea and culpability judgments, it must be used 
with extreme care and the procedural conventions for choosing such experts might require more 
attention.17  
Most of case law in which expert witness is decisive pertains to medical malpractice.18For 
US case law, the two landmark cases where expert witness evidence was decisive are Frye v. US 
(1923) and Daubert v. Merell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993). These two cases lead to the 
formulation of general standards of acceptability of expert witness evidence and influenced 
thousands of later cases, yet perhaps the standards need to be carefully reconsidered in light of our 
results. The Frye standard claims that expert witness evidence is admissible only if based on 
generally accepted theories in the scientific community. By contrast, the Daubert standard, which 
replaced the Frye standard, states that it is the judge who decides on which evidence shall prevail. 
If our results are to be taken seriously, then the Frye standard appears to be more reliable, since 
expert witness evidence can be extremely suggestive, and the judgment of the entire scientific 
community could be taken as more reliable than the judgement of a single person.  
 
8.4 Future Research 
Whereas the hindsight bias is well established, this paper is among the first (i) to examine its 
downstream effects and their inherent “mechanics” in detail, and (ii) to propose strategies to 
alleviate the systematic performance error. Further research should examine whether the results 
replicate with different scenarios, methods, alternative formulations of what we termed 
“subjective” and “objective” probability, and across different populations – in particular non-
WEIRD populations (see e.g. Barrett et al. 2016). There is, for instance, considerable evidence of 
a strong, cross-cultural effect of outcome on ascriptions of intention and knowledge (Kneer et al. 
ms). Moreover, legal experts from France (Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde 2017, Bourgeois-Gironde 
& Kneer, 2018), Germany (Prochownik et al. 2020), the Netherlands, Brazil, and the UK seem 
similarly affected as the folk (Kneer et al. ms; though cf. Tobia, ms. for diverging findings for the 
US). It thus stands to reason to explore whether the effects of outcome on the lower echelons of 
inculpating mental states – negligence and recklessness – are similarly robust across cultures and 
expertise. If so, this would suggest a systematic distortive effect of outcome information on mens 
                                               
17 Importantly, there are procedural differences across legal systems in who can choose and present an expert witness 
testimony in court. In adversarial systems where the judge has a limited procedural role (e.g. the US and the UK), 
expert witnesses are presented exclusively by the parties. By contrast, in inquisitorial systems (mainly continental 
Europe), the role of the judge in a trial is more active. Here, it is the judge who can choose and ask an expert witness 
to present an expertise. 
18 Notorious cases where expert testimony was controversial include in the UK ‘John Radford (formerly known as 
John Worboys) versus The Parole Board of England and Wales’ (2018); ‘Regina versus Georgina Sarah Anne Louise 
Challen’ (2019); ‘Regina versus Sally Clark’ (2003); ‘Guinness Plc versus Ernest Saunders Plc’ (1990). In these 
cases, expert witness testimony pertained to assessing either medical evidence concerning the victims or assessing the 
mental health of the perpetrator. 
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rea ascription of any kind. The possible threat to just legal ruling – not limited to countries with 
lay juror systems – would motivate serious exploration of debiasing strategies along the lines here 
proposed and beyond. 
 
Conclusion 
In a series of experiments with 2043 participants, we explored the effect of outcome on judgments 
of subjective and objective probability, mens rea and culpability. For mens rea and blame 
attributions (though not for punishment), the outcome effect constitutes a bias. The distorted 
assessment of mens rea and blame, we showed, is ultimately rooted in the hindsight bias: People 
tend to assess a potential, harmful outcome as more likely when it does come to pass than when it 
does not; they therefore ascribe more negligence to the agent, and consequently consider him more 
culpable.  
Echoing the literature from behavioral economics and legal psychology, we argued that the 
downstream effects of the hindsight bias constitute a serious threat to the just adjudication of legal 
trials, in particular in countries in which mens rea is determined by lay juries (such as the US and 
the UK). And although it is well established that the hindsight bias is pervasive and difficult to 
overcome, we have shown that there are measures to reduce its impact. Among a series of different 
debiasing strategies we have put to the test, we showed that expert probability stabilizing (which, 
on occasion, is already in use in courts) and entertaining counterfactual outcomes hold 
considerable promise. We would strongly urge further research conducted jointly with legal 
practitioners that explores the most suitable ways of introducing (or further implementing) these 
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